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“Could one conceive of a love that would not be an encroachment [empiètement] 
on the freedom of the other? . . . There is a paradox in accepting being loved 
by a person without wanting to have any influence on her freedom. . . . 
To consent to love or be loved is to consent also to influence someone else, to 
decide to a certain extent on behalf of the other.” 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception* 
“The revolution begins at home.” 
Cherríe Moraga & Gloria Anzaldúa, 
This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color
 
Strange it might seem to write about intimacy in the context of critical phenomenol-
ogy—especially when, as is the case here, no particular analysis will be given of the 
economic, political, or legal institutions that shape our intimacy, or of the ways in which 
sexist, heterosexist, racist or colonialist norms might operate within intimate relation-
ships. After all, as a contribution to critical theory, broadly construed, should a crit-
ical phenomenology not be aiming at the emancipation of humans from systems of 
oppression and domination through critical reflection upon the real effects of society’s 
institutions and practices?1 And is intimacy not something that is affected by these 
greater systemic forces of oppression, without being in itself an institution or practice 
that strips us of freedom? Feminists have long called upon us to recognize that “the 
personal is political,” but the implication seems generally to be that, if we can just free 
our intimate relations and home life from the oppressive norms and unjust institutions 
that currently structure them, we will secure a realm of mutual freedom that can serve 
as a refuge from, or even a site of resistance to, society and its oppressive forces.2 It ought 
not to be intimacy that we interrogate, on this view, but the systemic forces that fetter it. 
     * I have altered the translation of this passage slightly, substituting “accepting being loved by some-
one” for “accepting love from someone” to translate “accepter d’être aimé de quelqu’un.”   
     1 Max Horkheimer characterizes the goal of the Frankfurt School’s critical theory as “[hu]man’s 
emancipation” from situations of domination and oppression (1972, 246). This goal, he argues, substan-
tially differentiates critical theory from theory as understood by Descartes and the scientific-philosoph-
ical tradition that is inspired by him.
     2 This phrase is sometimes attributed to Carol Hanisch, on the basis of her essay entitled “The Per-
sonal is Political.” But Hanisch claims on her website (http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.
html) that she did not give the essay this title, and that it may have been the editors of the book it was in: 
Shulamith Firestone and Anne Koedt’s Notes from the Second Year: Women’s Liberation (1970). In any case, 
the idea behind this phrase has circulated far and wide in the field of feminist thought and activism, 
since before this publication as well as after it.  
                                    Intimacy as Trangression and the Problem of Freedom     • 19
Kym Maclaren
Puncta   Vol.1    2018 
     My intention, however, is to challenge this vision of intimacy, and to argue that, 
especially in our intimate relations, we are always inevitably involved in imposing what 
I will call a form of “unfreedom” upon our intimate others. I am not concerned, then, 
with systems of oppression that can be transformed and eradicated; I am interested, 
rather, in a form of “unfreedom” that enables all oppression, and which would remain 
even if we were able to free ourselves from systemic forms of oppression. My project is 
nonetheless one aimed at producing greater freedom, agency and becoming for individ-
uals. But this greater freedom will come not through emancipation, or the releasing of 
an individual freedom (or an intimate relationship of mutual freedom) from its fetters. 
It will come rather through owning up to the unfreedom that we inevitably impose 
upon our intimate others, and learning, precisely through an acknowledgment of that 
inevitable imposition of unfreedom, how to care for others, ourselves and our relation-
ships in ways that ultimately promote, rather than hinder, others’ freedom. It is this 
acknowledgment and learning that will enable the cultivation, within intimate rela-
tionships, of forms of agency that can stand up to and transform systems of oppression. 
     At the root of this challenge to our understanding of intimacy is a challenge to the 
idea that critical theory is concerned with emancipation—at least insofar as emanci-
pation implies a neoliberal, Cartesian model of agency. Judith Butler describes “an 
emancipatory model of agency”: 
 
. . . according to [this] view of agency, a subject is endowed with a will, a 
freedom, an intentionality . . .  [where] ‘freedom’ and ‘the will’ are treat-
ed as universal resources to which all humans qua humans have access. 
The self who is composed of such faculties or capacities is thus thwarted 
by relations of power which are considered external to the subject her-
self.  (Benhabib et al. 1995, 136)
On this account, the subject is free, emancipated, when her actions and thoughts are 
“the consequence of her ‘own will’ rather than of custom, tradition, or social coer-
cion” (Mahmood 2011, 11).3 Against this view of the subject, and the corresponding 
understanding of emancipation, critical phenomenology offers an alternative. Phenom-
enology takes note of the way in which institutions, practices, and other workings of 
power do not merely constrain us from the outside, but more profoundly, transgress 
into our experience and constitute the very manner in which we perceive the world 
and ourselves, the possibilities that we find available or not within our situation, and 
the positions that we feel ourselves legitimately able to assume.4 If, however, one’s ex-
      
      
     3 This is Saba Mahmood’s characterization of the neoliberal vision of the free subject. Mahmood’s 
book, Politics of Piety: the Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (2011), argues that, for all the good that 
feminist critiques have done—and they have done great good—some nonetheless fail to adequately 
understand the agency and experience of women committed to Islam because they are operating with 
neoliberal assumptions about the nature of freedom and agency (see, for instance, 13-14), or (as in But-
ler’s case) because they operate with a binary logic of subordination versus subversion, which supposes 
that freedom is realized only in the subversion of social norms. In contrast, Mahmood argues that we 
need to conceptualize agency “not simply as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as 
a capacity for action that specific relations of subordination create and enable” (18; italics in original). 
This conception of agency is aligned with the notion of freedom achieved through unfreedom that I am 
proposing in this essay.
     4 Frantz Fanon (1967) and Iris Marion Young (1990) offer paradigmatic examples of this, showing, 
respectively, how racism and sexism come to configure racialized and feminized subjects’ experiences 
of themselves and what is possible.
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perience is already infiltrated and configured by the human attitudes, practices, in-
stitutions, and artifacts that surround us, then freedom cannot lie in an agency set 
apart from social workings of power, and resistant to them; freedom must always be 
developed in and through an agency that is already transgressed by and established 
within these relations of power; freedom must always develop from within what we 
might call “unfreedom,” and by virtue of it.5 What distinguishes empowering or 
emancipating situations from oppressive ones, then, is not the presence or absence 
of transgressive normative social forces; it is rather the particular character of these 
transgressive forces. Some transgressions and configurations of experience—some 
forms of “unfreedom”—will tend to promote freedom; others will tend to hinder it. 
     In this essay, I propose to focus on one particular, but fundamental, site of trans-
gression and unfreedom: interpersonal relations. Though formal institutions, informal 
practices, discourses, and even architecture can encroach upon and configure our ex-
periences, the power they have to do this has its origins, I suggest, in our intersubjectivi-
ty. The first aim of this paper is thus to make the case that intersubjectivity is inherently 
transgressive, that one’s experience is inevitably infiltrated and informed by other peo-
ple’s behaviors and attitudes. This inevitable encroachment of one person’s perspective 
upon another’s—whether those people be strangers to one another, or intimates—I call 
“ontological intimacy.” Others reach into our experience, so that we are influenced 
by them whether we like it or not. Most others do not have as deep or thoroughgoing 
an effect on our experience, however, as intimate others do. The second task of this 
essay is thus to consider what distinguishes concrete, lived forms of intimacy from the 
“ontological intimacy” that I claim is always present between people, and to explore 
the responsibilities that intimates have to each other, precisely because we are always, 
inevitably transgressing upon each other’s experience and, as Merleau-Ponty asserts in 
the epigraph above, deciding to a certain extent on behalf of each other. How might we 
assume responsibility for the unfreedom we inflict upon others: the ways we shape their 
agency? How might we engage in these transgressions in ways that promote, rather 
than hinder, the development of freedom and greater agency? Answering these ques-
tions will remind us that the problem of promoting agency and freedom is addressed not 
only by critically analyzing the public institutions, practices and discourses that shape 
us, but also by critical insight into and transformation of our most private and intimate 
relationships. The revolution, as Moraga and Anzaldúa have said, begins at home. 
I.  
OUR ONTOLOGICAL INTIMACY WITH OTHER PERSONS: 
TRANSGRESSION AS COEXISTENCE AND DIVERGENCE
Our Cartesian heritage inclines us to think of intimacy in terms of certain beliefs and 
feelings that one harbors about another person: one feels oneself intimate with another 
when one believes one knows and is known by the other, or feels together with the other 
                 
      5 The transgression of others’ attitudes into our own is essentially what Martin Heidegger is claiming 
when he speaks, in chapter 4 of Being and Time, of the “they” (and claims that authentic being-one’s-self 
is “an existentiell modification of the they”—i.e., that one never leaves behind others’ transgression 
into and configuration of one’s perspective) (1962, 168). In his essays “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” 
(1993a) and “The Question Concerning Technology” (1993b), he also makes cases for how the built 
environment and modern technology configure our experience.  
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person and believes that the other feels the same way.6 Ontologically, these two persons 
are conceived, in the Cartesian tradition, as essentially separate. There is no direct en-
counter between them; each is given as an object of consciousness for the other, and thus 
each consciousness encounters not the other directly, but merely her own representation 
of that other. The experience of intimacy, we must conclude, lies not in actually being 
with an other, but rather in our representations of her (and of her representations of us). 
The other is, in other words, kept fundamentally at a distance from us by the interposi-
tion—between us—of representations, interpretations, or judgments about the nature of 
our relations. On the Cartesian account, real, ontological intimacy with another person 
is impossible; it is only our own judgments and feelings that are intimately present to us. 
     Against such a Cartesian account, Merleau-Ponty offers a vision of intersubjectivity 
wherein there is genuine contact between persons.  Here, the other is not first and fore-
most represented by us, but touches us, moves us, inhabits, and is inhabited by us.7 It 
is true that, insofar as we have the other as an object, we do interpret the other in our 
own terms, and, like representations, these interpretations will typically involve some 
degree of distortion. But, others are not given to us first and foremost as objects: they 
are rather present more fundamentally as perspectives that sweep us up and orient us 
towards the world—as what Merleau-Ponty calls “coexistences.”8 Moreover, even our 
objectifying interpretations are grounded in lived interpretations that are not effected 
primarily within our own private consciousnesses, as re-presentations therein of some-
one whose reality lies outside of our consciousness, but are rather enacted in our inter-
actions with others.9 And those enacted interpretations are not formed unilaterally but 
are worked out in embodied dialogue with the other, motivated by the ways in which 
those others are always already at work in pre-reflectively shaping our most basic un-
reflective experience of the world, and consolidated only insofar as the other assumes 
     6 See, for instance, Robert Sternberg’s characterization of intimacy as “feelings of closeness, connect-
edness, and bondedness … It thus includes those feelings that give rise, essentially, to the experience of 
warmth in a loving relationship” (2006, 185). Such intimacy, he claims, originates in self-disclosure, for 
intimacy requires “break[ing] down the walls that separate one person from another” (1998, 8). The 
intimate connection between people is therein viewed as being formed through verbal communication, 
which conveys private experiences linguistically from one separate individual to another, and produces 
certain intimate feelings and beliefs therein. For the Cartesian account of the subject that arguably 
underlies this view, see Descartes 1993, Meditations I-III in Meditations on First Philosophy; however, my 
interest is less in a scholarly assessment of Descartes’ own thought, which is nuanced, than with the less 
nuanced Cartesian assumptions that have come to characterize much of our contemporary philosoph-
ical, psychological, and common sense accounts of the self, and what it is to know.  
     7Merleau-Ponty compares his own account to the Cartesian account in Phenomenology of Perception: 
“these two [consciousnesses] are not cogitationes enclosed into their immanence, but beings who are tran-
scended by their world and who, consequently can surely be transcended by each other…[in such a way 
that their perspectives] slip into each other and are gathered together… in a single world in which we 
all participate as anonymous subjects of perception” (2012, 369/410–411). Henceforth, the 2012 English 
translation pagination will be followed by (unless otherwise noted) the French pagination.
     8 Though Merleau-Ponty refers often to this coexistence, he elaborates it most thematically in the 
chapter “Others and the Human World” in the Phenomenology of Perception, and in the essay “the Child’s 
Relations with Others.” The latter starts with a reflection on how children’s perceptions are shaped by 
their affective relations with their parents, and it proceeds to investigate how the capacity for children 
to experience both themselves as objects and their parents as objects develops only slowly.
      9 The language of “representation” is largely alien to phenomenology, because the aim is to chal-
lenge the notion of a separate inner subjectivity, and to call attention to the primacy of our being in the 
world, our actual, interpretive and understanding interaction with others. Nonetheless, there is a sense 
in which representations are still at play: when we step out of an interaction with another person, and 
think about them, talk about them with another, or gossip about them, we are arguably dealing with 
our own re-presentations of them (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 378/419).
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and confirms the lived interpretation we offer them; they are co-created.10 Thus, we 
do not, according to Merleau-Ponty, simply find others at the end of our gazes, as 
objects of our consciousness. We also, more fundamentally, co-inhabit others’ perspec-
tives: we see them, ourselves, and the world through their ways of being towards the 
world. Or, to say what amounts to the same thing: they are already at work within our 
ways of being in the world. As Heidegger puts it: we are Mitsein, or being-with others.11 
     In part, this being-with and mutual inhabitation shows up in the phenomenon of 
culture or “the social.” As Merleau-Ponty says, culture is not an object for us; it is rather 
“the permanent field” of our existence—or what “we inseparably bear along with us 
prior to every objectification” (2012, 379/420). To be born in the contemporary age, 
for instance, is already to live our relation to others and our political state, to knowl-
edge and science, to virtue and honor, to self-actualization, very differently than the 
ancients did. It is not that the child of the contemporary age thinks or represents these 
things differently. Even before she can think or objectify them, even before she forms 
her own interpretations of them, she is informed by the contemporary framework, in-
habited by contemporary assumptions, attuned by contemporary social practices in 
ways that give a certain direction or sens to her experience and configure her world in 
contemporary rather than ancient terms.12       
     But it is not only, or even most basically, in the public realm that we are swept 
up into this being-with and a mutual inhabitation of perspectives. It is true that as-
sumptions and attunements about who we are and how we ought to live are com-
municated in part by social institutions, practices, and discourses in the contexts 
in which we live. The rules, policies and norms into which I am disciplined carry 
with them, in other words, visions of what it is to be a subject, and my proper re-
lation to self, others, work, knowledge, and so on. But these rules that we live by 
are themselves communicated to me, for the most part and most powerfully, not 
by explicit assertions but by the bodily behaviors and embodied attitudes of oth-
ers:13            
     10 As Merleau-Ponty argues, we are able to objectify each other, and withdraw into solipsism and our 
own personal interpretations or representations of each other, only on the ground of a pre-existing 
communication with the other. We are fundamentally in contact with, in communication with, others 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 378/419). See also “The Philosopher and his Shadow”: “We would not over-
whelm them with our importunate comments, we would not stingily reduce them to what is objectively 
certified of them, if they were not there for us to begin with. Not to be sure with the frontal evidence of 
a thing, but installed athwart our thought” (1964c, 159). This being with others, this communication, 
this installation of the other within us, is conceived by Merleau-Ponty not as the result of a linguistic 
conveying of information about our private mental lives, but rather as “coexistence” or as being drawn 
in embodied ways into shared perspectives.  
     11 See Heidegger, Being and Time, especially §§ 25–27.
     12 Merleau-Ponty uses the French term sens to communicate a kind of sense or meaning [sens] that is 
not conceptual but unreflectively experienced, and which evokes a direction [sens] of interpretation, 
rather than a fully determinate, unambiguous, or finished meaning. For the idea that our culture is 
“lived concretely” rather than being an object of our attention (2012, 420/379–80). This is not to say, 
however, that the ancient worlds are inaccessible to us. As Merleau-Ponty notes, in this same passage, 
these ancient worlds are “marked on the borders of my own history . . . [and I] find the fundamental 
structures of history within my own life” which is why historical knowledge is possible.
     13 Merleau-Ponty also suggests that assumptions and attunements are communicated by cultural 
artifacts and our built environments (2012, 370/411–412). These artifacts and environments solicit us 
to take them up in certain ways and foreclose other ways of acting—and they thereby draw us into 
certain prejudices about what matters and how to behave, while also attuning us to certain issues and 
occluding others. Architect-philosopher Erik Rietveld and Ludger Van Dijk also explore these ideas 
(Van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017).         
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My gaze falls upon a living body performing an action and the objects 
that surround it immediately receive a new layer of signification. . . . A 
vortex forms around the perceived body into which my world is drawn 
and, so to speak, sucked in. . . . The other body is . . . the place of a 
certain elaboration and somehow a certain “view” of the world. (2012, 
369/411) 
This other as a view of the world into which I am “sucked” is not, then, an object of 
my perception so much as a self-effacing intentionality that turns me towards the world 
and objects in it. An example given by psychiatrist R.D. Laing illustrates this vividly: 
a parent responds with revulsion and disgust at the worm that her young child shows 
her (Laing 1971, 102–104). The child’s initial orientation in first showing the worm was 
one of pride and excitement at his discovery. But by virtue of his mother’s response he is 
re-oriented towards the dirtiness of the worm and his own shameful dirtiness. Indeed, 
through her response, a whole new dimension of reality—a new sense of what to as-
pire to, a new matrix for making sense of things—is opened up. Where the child had 
assumed that exploration and discovery were valuable, his mother announces—not so 
much through what she says as through the focus enacted in those words, and through 
her gestural recoil—that it is hygiene that really matters. “Clean = good; dirty = bad” 
(Laing 1990, 104). Here, the stance that “to be good, acceptable, loved, one must be 
clean” is not noted as an object; it operates rather as an intentionality or directional-
ity that sweeps the child’s experience up and carries it along with it towards relevant 
realities within the world. The parent’s stance transgresses into the child’s and attunes 
him in a certain way towards the world of dirtiness and cleanliness. In Merleau-Ponty’s 
words: 
 
Everything happens as if the other person’s intention inhabited my body, 
or as if my intentions inhabited his body. The gesture I witness sketches 
out the first signs of an intentional object. This object becomes present 
and is fully understood when the powers of my body adjust to it and fit 
over it. The gesture is in front of me like a question, it indicates to me 
specific . . . points in the world and invites me to join it there. Communi-
cation is accomplished when my behavior finds in this pathway its own 
pathway. I confirm the other person, and the other person confirms me. 
(191/225)
  Through this primordial communication (this mutual inhabitation and confirmation 
at the behavioral level) what is an object to us is not the other nor the matrix of meaning 
into which she draws us, but only the things that are put into relief by her orientation. 
     Before the other herself is an object, then, the other is a co-intentionality: a coexis-
tence towards the world. She is, we might say, a medium for the world: it is through 
co-inhabiting her directedness towards the world that we establish, with her, the world 
as a shared reality.    
     Now, in the particular example that we have given, we can see what could be called 
a “colonization” of the child’s experience by his mother’s way of perceiving: her con-
cerns with cleanliness eclipse and in some sense usurp his initial experience of the pride 
and excitement of discovery. Or, we might say, the child’s experience is assimilated into 
the mother’s, and transfigured in its meaning for him. This transgression of one per-
spective into the other stands in stark contrast with the mental isolation and freedom 
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assumed by our Cartesian heritage. What we have just described is one person (the 
child) coming to see with (or according to) the other (the parent). On the Cartesian view, 
there can be no such seeing with. For the Cartesian, we are locked within our own ways 
of making sense of the world; we are, as Merleau-Ponty describes it, two “cogitationes 
enclosed into their [respective] immanence” (2012, 410–411/369). We encounter the 
other’s linguistic and bodily behavior only ever as an object in our world, and, as a re-
sult, the meaning that behavior has for us can only ever be a result of our own attribu-
tion of meaning. What the other intends in her behavior or communication is, for the 
Cartesian, something to which we do not have access; stuck within our own system of 
meanings and interpretations, we are also stuck merely making our own sense of the 
other, irrespective of the sense they intend. Correlatively, then, we always leave the 
other “free” to think what she will think; and we impede upon her freedom only exter-
nally, by virtue of the obstacles we present to her own free decisions. In contrast with 
this Cartesian understanding of our ontological relations with others, our example of 
the parent’s colonization of her child’s way of seeing asserts that we do transgress into 
and transfigure others’ experiences, never leaving them entirely “free” to make their 
own sense of the world. There is an inevitable violation by us of others’ perspectives: a 
determining and transforming of the meaning of their experience. As we will see, how-
ever, this “unfreedom” is not simply opposed to freedom.     
     Such transgression might seem, at first sight, a negative and constraining phenome-
non. Indeed, in the case of the little boy’s re-attunement to matters of hygiene, one 
could argue that it is constraining, for it disconfirms and threatens to shut down his 
interest in exploration and discovery—interests which are essential to growth and be-
coming. But, one person’s “usurpation” of another’s sense-making can also bring bene-
fits and liberations. This is made evident in the phenomenon of learning, as Mer-
leau-Ponty understands it: transgression of one person’s experience by another’s is a 
condition of learning. Were it the case that we only ever made sense of the other’s ges-
tures and expressions in terms of our own resources, we would never learn anything 
truly transformative; we would remain imprisoned within our own basic, subjective 
terms of reference.  But in fact we do learn from others. To read a great book, to hear 
an insightful speech, even to witness a wise teacher or parent in action is to be taken 
beyond our current sense-making capacities, and drawn into new relations to the world 
and to ourselves (see, for example, 2012, 184–185/218–219 and 188/222–223). We are 
carried, through these others’ bodily and linguistic expressions, into new realizations—
which is to say, into new ways of finding the world configured and correspondingly into 
a recognition of new dimensions of reality heretofore unknown to us. Others’ transgres-
sions of our experience can, then, open up for us new possibilities while also revealing 
the limitations of our characteristic modes of sense-making. Insight into new, richer 
dimensions of reality is only possible because we co-inhabit others’ perspectives, be-
cause we are drawn into their way of perceiving or they transgress into ours. 
     It is this transgression into another’s perspective that I propose to call “ontological 
intimacy.” It is an intimacy because by virtue of it, the other touches and shapes me not 
just from the outside, but within my most “private,” personal experience. It is ontologi-
cal because it occurs simply by virtue of the kinds of beings we are—intersubjective 
beings. Let us note, however, that the transgression involved is never a complete usur-
pation of an individual’s perspective. One can coexist with others, co-inhabiting a 
shared world; but one is never thereby fully reduced to, or taken over by, the other’s 
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perspective. In varying degrees, and due always to the singularity and historicity of our 
own situation, each individual inevitably maintains some degree of écart or divergence 
from others’ perspectives. Transgression thus involves both difference and coexis-
tence—or, as Merleau-Ponty notes, “solitude and communication [are]… two moments 
of a single phenomenon” (2012, 376/535).        
     It is perhaps worth precluding a possible misunderstanding here. This divergence or 
difference, this solitude as the other side of communication, is not, on Merleau-Ponty’s 
account, the result of a true personal will or an untouched individual freedom that 
maintains itself in the face of—and as resistant to—social forces that threaten it. We are 
not returning here to a neoliberal, Cartesian notion of the subject. Rather, such diver-
gence and difference arises from the ways in which any individual is, by virtue of her 
social relations and her personal stage of development, inevitably implicated in and 
transgressed by competing visions of the world.    
     Thus, one reason for a person’s écart from another’s perspective lies in her lack of 
development or preparedness for inhabiting the other’s view. A child, for instance, may 
feel largely unmoved or even bewildered by a poem, song lyric, or discourse about sex-
ual desire: for her life experience and her pre-pubescent body have not yet prepared her 
for genuine insight, for being drawn into this form of experiencing. Though she may 
catch onto, and even be vaguely attuned by, the basic gesture of this communication, 
that which it outlines in the world remains largely mysterious for her. There is signifi-
cant divergence here even as there is also overlap and coexistence.     
     Another reason for a person’s divergence from others’ transgressions into her per-
spective lies in that person’s involvement in relations whose visions of reality conflict 
with that transgressive configuration of experience. Thus, though an employer’s dismis-
siveness and contempt might reach deeply into an employee’s sense of self and place in 
the world, that employee may also be able to gain a distance from it, insofar as she is 
also implicated in relationships that validate her as intelligent, competent, worthwhile.14 
It is not her autonomous will and intellect that thus resists total usurpation; it is rather 
the fact that she finds herself in the context of other relationships reflected and realized 
in very different ways.15            
     Finally, a person may be able to diverge from, and retrieve herself from, another’s 
usurpation of her perspective if differing reflections of herself have been incorporated 
      14 For an extended and insightful reflection on the multiple ways in which we can be implicated in 
and re-defined by other’s ways of being, see Gail Weiss’s book Body Images: Embodiment as Intercorporeality. 
Weiss sums up her own argument in the book effectively: “human beings tend to have multiple body 
images and . . . these body images overlap with one another and are themselves constructed, recon-
structed, and deconstructed through a series of ongoing, intercorporeal exchanges” (1999, 165).
     15 In “Between Two Intimacies” (2014), John Russon argues that one’s development as an auton-
omous adult actually requires experiencing the tensions between two different ways of being situat-
ed, reflected, and defined in intimate relationships, or, more precisely, between two forms of intima-
cy: familial, and non-familial. He proposes that the developing individual needs to experience (a) a 
familial intimacy that fosters a sense of agency and belonging in the world, but also (b) non-famil-
ial intimacies that are in tension with the familiar, and that motivate self-definition in and through 
a transformation of the institutions established in familial intimacy.  Here, we can see the impor-
tance of multiple interpersonal involvements for personal development, and, more specifically, the 
importance of having intimate relationships beyond the familial realm.     
     Advocates for survivors of domestic violence note that one of the primary ways in which abusers 
maintain power and control over the abused is by isolating the abused from other relationships that 
might challenge the vision of self and partner maintained within the abusive relationship. See, for in-
stance, Shannon Perez-Darby’s “The Secret Joy of Accountability: Self-Accountability as a Building 
Block for Change” (2016, 109). Perez-Darby is Deputy Director at The Northwest Network of Bi, Trans, 
Lesbian & Gay Survivors of Abuse.
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into her habitual sense of self and world. If, for instance, a young woman has grown up 
in a household with progressive values, such that these have come to be a part of her 
own habitual embodiment, then even if she is momentarily swept away by conservative 
values in dialogue with another so that—as the dialogue unfolds—she comes to see the 
world as the other does, she can nonetheless retrieve herself after the fact by a with-
drawal into her own familiar forms of sense-making. Therein, she may find a perspec-
tive that sheds a new light on, or puts her in tension with, the perspective that had 
transgressed into her and momentarily taken her over. Merleau-Ponty calls attention to 
this capacity for withdrawal and self-retrieval, after having been carried away, through 
dialogue, into another way of seeing: 
 
 
In the experience of dialogue . . . there is a being-shared-by-two [un 
être à deux] . . . We are, for each other, collaborators in perfect reciproc-
ity: our perspectives slip into each other, we coexist through a single 
world. I am freed from myself in the present dialogue, even though 
the other’s thoughts are certainly his own, since I do not form them, 
I nonetheless grasp them as soon as they are born or I even antici-
pate them. And even the objection raised by my interlocutor draws 
from me thoughts I did not know I possessed such that if I lend him 
thoughts, he makes me think in return. Only après coup—when I have 
withdrawn from the dialogue and am remembering it—can I reinte-
grate it into my life, turn it into an episode of my own private history. 
(2012, 370–371/412)  
 
     To speak of transgression or of ontological intimacy is not to deny, then, that there 
is divergence and difference within that intimacy. Indeed, the simultaneity of this onto-
logical divergence with ontological coexistence is in part what drives us, within the con-
crete, empirical forms of interaction with others, to pursue further, more intimate rela-
tions with others. I encounter someone who (in the ways in which she deals with the world 
and with others) reveals to me that she perceives what I perceive, that we share an out-
look, and thus that she can perceive me in ways that others cannot. I experience already 
a kind of being with her. And yet, at the same time, the overlap is not perfect; while her 
perspective coexists with mine, it also thereby orients me towards something more to be 
perceived, something that I have not yet fully seen—in both myself and the world. While 
I am with her, in other words, she is also taking me beyond myself. She thereby offers to 
me—and if I am lucky, I can offer to her—the promise of a deepening relation to self and 
reality. This promise of greater intimacy, born out of our simultaneous coexistence and 
difference and thus felt in her transgression of my perspective, draws me towards her. 
     At the basis of all interpersonal communication and learning, then, is this ontological 
intimacy or intertwining wherein, on the one hand, one’s very sense of the world and one-
self is profoundly configured by others, and on the other hand, we feel our difference and 
divergence from them. Others are both beyond us and within us, inhabiting to a greater 
or lesser degree our intentionalities while we inhabit, to a greater or lesser degree, theirs. 
     Note though, that despite making my point primarily though examples of intimate 
relationships, I am proposing that it is not just in love but in all interpersonal relations 
that others are intimately present within us, always already ‘influencing’ us, ‘deciding 
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on our behalf.’ We must ask, then, what distinguishes love, or our particular concrete 
experiences of intimacy from this fundamental, ever-present ontological intimacy?
 
II. 
CONCRETE INTIMACY, MOMENTARY MUTUAL RECOGNITION  
AND SHARED INTERPERSONAL INSTITUTIONS
I have said that our being is characterized by a fundamental ontological intimacy with 
others.  But precisely because it is fundamental or ontological, this “ontological intima-
cy” is operative to some extent whether we are encountering a distant stranger or an 
intimate partner. Audre Lorde describes a childhood experience on the subway: a 
stranger expresses horror and disgust when Lorde—a black child—sits down beside 
her. Eventually leaving her seat to avoid contact with the child, the stranger infiltrates 
Lorde’s own experience of herself, leaving her with a sense that she is somehow bad 
(1984, 147–148).16 A mature person, with a more established sense of self, or who is wis-
er to the ways of a racist world, might respond to the stranger with outrage or disdain; 
but even then, the act of resistance is premised upon transgression. On the one hand, 
the mature person can resist only because, through others’ transgressions into her sense 
of self, she has incorporated and consolidated a vision of self at odds with the stranger’s 
reaction to her. On the other hand, she is moved to resist because the stranger’s re-
sponse is experienced as a transgression: the stranger’s response is only disturbing to the 
mature person because it is not merely a failing within the stranger, limited to the 
stranger’s mind; it is simultaneously a transgression into and shaping of others’ experi-
ences. She is having an effect on how others see and respond to race. If strangers can 
intimately transgress into our experience like this, however—if it is not just in our inti-
mate relationships that others “get inside” us—then what is there to distinguish inti-
mate relationships from encounters—even alienating, oppressive encounters—with 
distant others?  How ought we to distinguish our concrete experiences of intimacy from 
ontological intimacy?  
     What I propose in this section is that there are two interrelated “layers” to concrete 
intimacy. The two layers are mutual-self-definition in this moment, and shared habits 
or institutions that endure through time. This notion of layers is indebted to Mer-
leau-Ponty’s distinction of the body at this moment and the habitual body (2002, 95).17 In the 
context of accounting for the phenomena of phantom limbs, Merleau-Ponty argues that 
one’s experience is configured both at the level of one’s current embodiment and at the 
level of one’s habitual embodiment. This explains how, for the person with the phantom 
limb, the world can show up as soliciting him as a two-limbed person (this is the habit 
body at work) and as marking out his deficiency (this is the current body at work). The 
result in this case is the experience of a limb that is only ambiguously present—neither 
     16 Fanon similarly describes the ways in which prejudiced attitudes shape our sense of self and possibil-
ity by speaking of a “historico-racial schema” (1967, 111–112): the idea is that others’ perspectives have 
come to be embodied in our very sense of what is open or not for us to do, what possibilities lie available 
to us. For more recent work and a reflection on Anzaldúa’s writings about racialization, see Florentien 
Verhage, Living With(out) Borders (2014).   
     17 I have used Colin Smith’s translation of “corps actuel” as “body at this moment” rather than Donald 
Landes’ “actual body” because I think Smith’s translation better captures the temporal connotation of 
the French which is its dominant connotation. “Current body” would equally work.   
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a real arm nor an absent arm, but a phantom arm. The more the habit body prevails, 
the more the individual experiences himself as two-armed; the more the layer of the 
current body predominates, the more the individual experiences himself as one-armed. 
And ultimately, the overcoming of the phantom limb will require the transformation of 
the old habit body in order to integrate it with the new, current, one-armed body (2012, 
82–88/109–116).             
     Drawing on this conception of layers of embodiment, I am proposing that our inti-
mate relationships involve two layers as well: on the one hand, a taking up and inform-
ing of one another in the moment (ideally co-enacted as mutual recognition) and, on the 
other hand, shared interpersonal institutions, or habitual, enduring, and co-enacted 
visions of who we are, how to live, and what matters (ideally co-established in a manner 
that supports mutual recognition and becoming). In each case, there is an intertwining 
of worlds and identities so that who I am, what I see in the world, and the possibilities I 
experience are inseparable from who you are, what you see, and the possibilities that 
you experience. It is, in each layer, as if we shared a common but two-headed body, an 
“intercorporeity” (e.g., 1964c, 168, where the French word is translated as “intercorpo-
reality,” 1968, 141). We will see that, like in the individual body, one or the other of 
these two layers of intercorporeity can predominate, but concrete intimacy is realized 
in its fullest form when the two work with each other so that the layer of shared institu-
tions supports mutual recognition and growth, and the layer of current mutual recog-
nition can nourish and transform the shared institutions.      
     Consider the first layer mentioned—that of current, in the moment, mutual self-defi-
nition. In the example of Lorde on the subway, or the child with the worm, the adult—
through ontological intimacy—defines the child, and the child is drawn into this defi-
nition of itself. This co-inhabitation of a way of seeing the child is, however, also 
experienced as alienating by the child. The adult’s transgression into the child’s way of 
experiencing induces an inner conflict, wherein one way of experiencing (e.g., this child 
is/I am bad and dirty) suppresses another (this child is/I am a successful explorer or 
basically good). This alienating realization of ontological intimacy is not an experience 
of concrete intimacy.           
     Concrete intimacy in the moment, in contrast, is marked by a lived sense of connec-
tion. We experience ourselves as intimately with another, and this happens when we co-
exist with the other in the moment, experiencing her as seeing, in the world, what we, 
too, see, but many others do not. We thereby experience her insight as reaching more 
deeply into us and our world than others’ insights do (and our insight as reaching more 
deeply into her and her world). Such intimacy in the “at this moment” layer can hap-
pen, interestingly, even between strangers, and it can be profound in its moment. 
Strangers on a subway may, in a moment of shared laughter or in a situation of crisis, 
find themselves drawn temporarily into coexistence and a common world. To focus on 
the situation of crisis, living through and responding to an emergency together, facing 
with each other our human vulnerability and mortality, we may experience the power-
ful intimacy of being together in touch with a much deeper reality than is sustained by 
most of our mundane relations.18 Even if we never see each other again, this experience 
may remain with us as one in which we felt an unusual and deep connection—in that 
 
     18 This experience is vividly thematized in J.G. Ballard’s novel Crash.
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moment. Similarly, short-lived erotic encounters (like those we often call “one-night 
stands”) can sometimes involve a deeper intimacy than our more familiar relationships. 
Without the baggage of a shared past and the expectations that unfold from this, each 
participant may be open to, and able to go along with, realities and potentials in each 
other that are typically occluded in her other relationships. Each participant may, in-
deed, help the other to discover aspects of herself that were heretofore unrealized by 
her. This experience of being seen not only for who we take ourselves to be, but also for 
who we had not until now realized we were or could be, is a profound experience of 
mutual recognition. It tends to stand out from the rest of our mundane life, often high-
lighting hollowness, disconnection, misrecognition, or loneliness therein.  
     But there is also another sense of intimacy—another layer—that characterizes en-
duringly intimate relationships. This is an abiding, shared sense of how to go about 
living life and being in relationship. It takes the form of shared, interpersonal “institu-
tions” that, often without noticing, we co-enact and co-establish in our behaviors. We 
might also call these “sedimented patterns” or “dynamics of behavior” or “structures of 
relating,” but “institution”—if we understand this term as Merleau-Ponty does—allows 
us to see how these patterns of behavior are equally shared ways of orienting ourselves 
to what really matters and perceiving ourselves in relation to each other and the world 
beyond us. For Merleau-Ponty, institution does not denote our usual sense of institu-
tion—a public establishment or association, like a school or a prison, which is purpose-
fully and formally set up and organized to promote some end. For Merleau-Ponty, insti-
tution can be found, for example, in a person’s individual development, in an artist’s 
style, in the love that is established between two people, or in a historical event.19 Insti-
tution, in these contexts, means “establishment in an experience . . . of dimensions . . . 
system of references . . . in relation to which a whole series of other experiences will 
make sense and will make a sequel, a history” (2010, 8–9/38);  it is the founding of a 
field or frame of reference in terms of which all that appears makes a new sense.    
     In intimate relationships, shared customs around dinner-making, money-spending, 
television-watching, and conflict are small or local instances of such interpersonal insti-
tutions; and their specific character is manifest in the ways in which these dynamics 
establish and support a certain identity and position for each member of the relation-
ship.  Providing the frame of reference for our interactions, these co-enacted institutions 
also install shared values and assumptions that, when they are truly shared, allow us to 
function smoothly together, and to feel at home with each other, like we belong. They 
allow us to feel with each other. Such interpersonal institutions thus found an “intersub-
jective or symbolic field . . . which is our milieu, our hinge, our jointure” (2010, 6/35).  
     This instituted layer of intimacy is largely lacking in intimate encounters between 
strangers. Though a stranger in an erotic one-night encounter may see me deeply and 
insightfully in that moment, we may experience great difficulties if we attempt to con-
tinue that relationship beyond the moment. We may find ourselves unable to live with 
each other if the routine paths and practices that give meaning to our lives and inform 
our senses of self diverge too much, and if we are unable to let go of them without losing 
our sense of self. An enduring intimacy, in other words, involves not only the capacity 
      
      19 Merleau-Ponty, Institution and Passivity: Course Notes from the Collège de France (1954-1955) (2010, 5–113; 
33–154 in the French edition). Henceforth, the English translation pagination will be followed by the 
2010 French pagination. See also my essay, “The ‘entre-deux’ of Emotions” (2017) for an exposition of 
Merleau-Ponty’s use of “institution” and a defense of the claim that the emotion of love is an institution 
established between two people, through their mutual transgression into each other’s experience.
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to be with another person within a circumscribed moment, but also the capacity to 
forge an enduring shared world, or habitual ways of being that are inhabitable by both 
intimates.                  
     In institution as Merleau-Ponty conceives of it, the dimension or frame of references 
established is not consciously chosen for some particular purpose: it is the “establish-
ment of a system of distribution of values or of significations . . . which is practiced . . . not 
acquired notionally” (2010, 25/60; italics in original); it is “a non-decisionary project, 
not chosen” by a constituting subject, but rather established through “productivity of 
what I am doing in the other and of what he is doing in me” (6/34–35). But the new 
symbolic field is nonetheless instituted because it offers a lived, unreflective answer to a 
problem that was merely latent within the previous field of experience:   
 
[h]uman institution always resumes a prior institution, which has 
posed a question, . . . and which has failed. It reactivates this prob-
lem and human institution reunites its givens in [a] totality that is 
centered otherwise . . . . It is not a state of consciousness . . . and it 
is not an object of consciousness. The modes of existence of the ques-
tion and answer are dimensions of a field, dimensions in which all of 
what is lived is distributed, but which are not lived for themselves.”  
(2010, 22–23/58; italics in original)
 
In other words, an interpersonal institution is the establishment, between two or more 
people, of an agreed upon way of doing things and of defining each other’s positions. 
But the agreement is established not through purposeful reflection and explicit verbal 
endorsement, but practically and unreflectively through the un-self-conscious develop-
ment of shared practices and discourses.       
     These shared practices and discourses, and the interpersonal institutions that they 
realize, are settled upon precisely because they allow each member a certain position in 
the world which responds to latent tensions and problems which that member has been 
experiencing within her life. The institution is co-established as a solution to such ten-
sions. But the solution is typically arrived at largely passively and unreflectively by 
happening together upon a way of being that works in response to problems experi-
enced by each member rather than by each member self-consciously and purposefully 
intending this solution. Indeed, neither the solution, nor the tensions and problems 
which motivate it are typically acknowledged or made explicit. Rather, two or more 
people simply settle into a way of being together that, in some vague way, seems fitting, 
satisfying, settling. 20   
     The function and nature of shared interpersonal institutions can be further clarified 
through a couple of examples. John Russon, in his book Bearing Witness to Epiphany: Per-
sons, Things, and the Nature of Erotic Life (2009), describes two intimate relationships that 
 
 
     20 Napier and Whitaker, in The Family Crucible (1978), describe entrenched family systems of inter-
action that are instances of such “shared interpersonal institutions”; Minuchin likewise describes, in 
Psychosomatic Families (1978), family patterns of mutual self-definition, and the ways in which these can 
work to make one family member sick. Laing calls such family patterns “social phantasy systems” in 
Self and Others (1971, ch. 2 and ch. 8). And Berne, in Games People Play (1964), elaborates particular forms 
that these institutions can take and the ulterior motives that they serve. Berne calls these institutions 
“games.”    
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enact in different ways such institutions (Russon calls them “bonds”).21 Considering 
these will also, in preparation for this essay’s final section on freedom, help us to see how 
the mutual transgressions and coexistence involved can either inhibit each person’s own 
becoming and development, or enrich and support it.   
     In one intimate relationship, a man and a woman have developed a shared sense of 
themselves as “rebels, whose nonconformity to the standards of others marks their own 
greater insight into the way things should be” (Russon 2009, 80). This shared vision 
constitutes a bond between them, with each affirming and supporting the other in their 
positioning of self and other. At the same time, this vision of themselves shapes how they 
see and respond to the rest of the world: any critical reflections from other friends, for 
instance, can be dismissed, as lacking in insight. This bond between them—this inter-
personal institution—thus involves mutual transgression and the transformation of 
each other’s basic orientation. Each lives from the assumption that they are such rebels, 
and endorses and feels endorsed by the other’s perspective on this; they thereby habitu-
ally inhabit that perspective together. Each has become part of the other’s orienting 
form of embodiment, then, by virtue of having incorporated the other’s perspective into 
his or her own way of perceiving.  What shows up as valuable and as possible within the 
world is conditioned by this coexistence. This relationship is satisfying, moreover, be-
cause this shared institution responds to inchoate, not fully recognized problems that 
they had each previously felt in their dealings with others—distrust of others, and fears 
and anxieties about being criticized; it is a kind of solution to those problems. And yet, 
as much as this solution responds to latent problems from the past, it also inaugurates a 
form of life that undermines each member’s own becoming. Essentially, these two have 
developed a self-enclosed relationship which shields them from any criticisms or per-
spectives that friends might bring to bear—criticisms or perspectives that might reveal 
limits or problems, foreclosures, or occlusions in the couple’s ways of making sense of 
things. They have thus instituted a self-confirming, self-perpetuating way of being that 
results in stagnancy, rather than in learning, growth, or becoming. As Russon says, 
“this couple enacts a fundamental denial of the self-transformative possibilities—and 
imperatives—of their interhuman situation” (81).       
     Compare this with a second relationship described by Russon (2009, 81-2): this is a 
couple, two women, who find in each other affirmation of aspects of themselves that 
were denied in their former long-term relationships—aspects like their intelligence and 
competence, the value of their emotional depth, and the validity of their sexual desires. 
Their relationship thus involves the institution of a bond that affirms the agency and 
worth of each member, and thereby draws them each out of old and unsatisfying pat-
terns of subordination to, or manipulative seduction of, others. Together they thereby 
establish a form of coexistence that serves as a kind of protection or shield. But in this 
case, what they are shielding against is not learning from others and the growth that 
can bring, but rather the kinds of misrecognitions—and indeed, shared institutions—
that can draw and have drawn them into self-undermining ways of perceiving them-
selves and the world. They have transgressed into and shaped each other’s habitual 
sense of self and possibility; they have established in their bond a shared institution, a 
      
     21  I am drawing from a section of the book where Russon is establishing what ethical imperatives and 
responsibilities must characterize interpersonal relations, given the nature of intersubjectivity or what 
he calls “the epiphany of the other” (2009, ch. 4). Russon’s ideas in this section helped to crystallize for 
me something of the import of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of intersubjectivity. The last two sections 
of this paper are thus much indebted to Russon’s thought here. 
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certain way of coexisting towards the world, themselves, and each other; but they have 
done this in a manner that ultimately promotes each person’s self-actualization and 
development. For, on the basis of this bond or institution, each member of this relation-
ship now experiences herself as capable of taking initiative, able to be more honest with 
herself and others, inclined to cultivate more substantial relations with others outside of 
this intimate relationship, and engaged with larger social and political concerns—all of 
which are conducive to learning, becoming, and developing.             
     In these two examples, we see how an enduring bond or shared institution is set up 
between two people in a manner that involves mutual transgression and an abiding 
sense of who they each are in relation to each other and the world.     
     This intimacy as shared institution should not, I am arguing, be confused with inti-
macy in the moment: these are two different layers which can in fact be at odds with 
each other—though ideally we want them to support each other. A further example 
from Eric Berne’s Games People Play (1964) helps to illustrate the dissonance that can 
occur between these layers of intimacy. Berne describes a very common dynamic be-
tween intimates—a dynamic that he names “If It Weren’t for You.” In this situation, a 
couple is constantly in conflict, experiencing a repeated lack of momentary intimacy, 
but only by virtue of being entangled in the same structure or shared institution. In 
other words, it turns out that they are in fact collaborating and supporting each other 
in who they are, engaging in an implicitly agreed upon ritual of mutual self-definition, 
even though it seems to them that they are disagreeing, and they feel alienated from, 
and not really recognized by, each other. The disagreement takes the form of one per-
son (we will say she is a woman) demanding of her partner (a man, let us say) that he stay 
home with her, and not go out on his own adventures with others. The man, for his side, 
feels like he is being kept from realizing his full potential because of the woman’s needs. 
“If it weren’t for her” he would be realizing his true potential. When, however, the 
woman relents and allows the man to go out, he realizes that he has great fears of going 
out. The dynamic between them, then, was not one of her keeping him home, simply; 
it was an institution that they co-established, and both needed. It worked for her be-
cause it relieved her of fears of abandonment. It worked for him because he was able to 
avoid his fears and anxieties of taking on new things and developing himself. What 
looked like struggle, disagreement, and misrecognition, was rooted in a shared pact; 
and though the frequent arguments and tensions left them feeling alone and misrecog-
nized in the moment, they were at the same time an expression of their entanglement, 
co-dependency and shared institution—an expression, that is, of an enduring form of 
intimacy, albeit one that works against intimacy at the momentary level.22    
     Concrete intimacy, then, occurs at two levels or layers each made possible by the 
transgressions of ontological intimacy. In each layer, we establish a kind of shared body, 
an intercorporeity, such that your way of taking me up is incorporated into my sense of 
world and self, and my way of taking you up is incorporated into yours. In one layer, we 
find intimacy at this moment, experienced as connection: here, if there is intimacy, it is 
because when each incorporates or is transgressed by the other’s orientation, there is an 
experience of mutual recognition. Each finds themselves, the world, and the other per-
 
     22 Eric Berne adds the important insight that, even though these two feel alone and misrecognized, 
their arguments and fights actually are ways of connecting or “stroking” each other—albeit in painful, 
rather than pleasurable, ways (1964, 15).
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ceived in ways that are deeply aligned with their own orientation, and that may even 
further their own insights. But intimacy also occurs at another level, in another layer—
that of shared institutions. Here, even when an experience of momentary connection is 
missing, two people can be deeply intertwined: in an enduring, habitual manner, they 
transgress into, and actively inform and uphold each other’s way of being in the world. 
Through their habitual practices and the ritually patterned dynamics therein, each 
intimate is dependent upon the other for her sense of who she is in the world and how 
to be at home there.            
     We have seen, moreover, that these layers of intimacy can inhibit our development 
as individuals, or enable and encourage it. Momentary intimacy can help us realize 
aspects of ourselves (and possibilities within the world) that were until then merely latent 
within our experience. Our shared institutions, on the other hand, can either trap us in 
dynamics that close us off from learning, or establish a form of mutual self-definition 
that opens us up to and promotes self-development. The challenge, then, is to live our 
enduring relationships, with their inevitable transgressions and their resulting institu-
tions, in ways that allow for genuine becoming: for a creative taking up and expressive 
transformation of the past, for the establishment of new institutions—personal and in-
terpersonal—that better support each person’s growth. Such transformation or genuine 
becoming is what Merleau-Ponty understands as freedom. 
 
III.  
THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AND THE CHALLENGES OF INTIMACY
I contend that freedom in Merleau-Ponty’s thought is ultimately understood as be-
coming: freedom is enacted not in a moment’s decision but in a temporally ex-
tended process of self-overcoming. Latent tensions within our situation gradually 
emerge and motivate our assumption of a new existential orientation that both re-
solves those tensions and brings to expression a truth secretly harbored within them. 
Thereby, a new existential equilibrium is instituted within our lives, a new way 
of living and being is realized, and a new sense of the past and future established. 
Freedom is, in other words, realized in a process of creative self-transformation. 
     The individual who has lost her voice recovers it. The exploited and oppressed 
worker becomes a revolutionary. The analysand with the inferiority complex realizes 
a more honest habitual orientation towards herself. The gambler overcomes his ad-
diction. Each transformation is a move from lesser to greater degrees of freedom, and 
each involves moments of initiative—saying no to one direction, and yes to another. 
But, says Merleau-Ponty, initiative is not yet freedom (2012, 463/502). The gambler 
can say no to gambling in one moment, only to be drawn back into it in the next. 
For (greater) freedom to be realized, a new way of life must take hold, motivated by 
tensions in the past, and supported by an enduring transformation of their meaning. 
If we can speak of a decision or choice, Merleau-Ponty says, it is “a conversion of our 
existence . . . [which] assumes a preexisting acquisition [and] establishes a new tradi-
tion” (463/502). As such, the conversion cannot be an unconditioned choice executed 
in an isolated moment: it is rather the culmination of a transformation that is pre-
pared only through time, as if in secret, through a gradual articulation of tensions and 
indeterminate directionalities within one’s situation. To use Merleau-Ponty’s example 
(468–471/507–509), the day-laborer becomes a revolutionary not in an instantaneous 
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conscious decision, but rather through being drawn, over time and through contin-
gent events, into coexistence with small farmers and city workers; through thereby 
becoming attuned to the contradictions of their shared situation; and through finally 
finding in the revolutionary words and actions of others a meaningful crystallization 
of that situation. If there is at all a moment that might be deemed the transforma-
tional instant of realization, the moment of conversion and coming to revolutionary 
consciousness, it is only the pinnacle or the final coming to expression of something 
that took form in a long and secret gestation through what Merleau-Ponty calls a “mo-
lecular process” (471/510) or a series of shifts and slippages (476/514, 482/519–20).23 
     Merleau-Ponty, following Cézanne, also speaks of this process as a kind of “germina-
tion.” An artist, he says, paints not by knowing in advance what she is going to put on 
the canvas, but rather by “germinating” with the landscape: 
 
[There is] motivation that comes simultaneously from colors, light, sub-
stance, movement, a call from all of that to a movement of the hand 
which resolves the problem while being unaware of it . . . The choices 
are the trace of this labor of “germination.” (2010, 47/86)
Similarly, a day-laborer attains to revolutionary consciousness and greater freedom not 
by knowing in advance what he seeks, but rather by “germinating” over time with his 
social conditions, and being motivated by them to assume a new social position which 
retrospectively transforms and resolves a problem that had been largely latent and 
merely inchoately felt. Freedom, then, is realized in coming back to one’s situation, ac-
cepting and germinating with it to the point of being able to take it up, transform it, and 
thereby move beyond it: “it is by resolutely taking up what I am by chance, by willing 
what I will, by doing what I do, that I can go farther” (2012, 482–3/520). And if we do 
not germinate with and take up our own situation then we fail to attain real freedom: 
“the only way I can fail to be free is if I attempt to transcend my natural and social 
situation by refusing to take it up first.” The addict who presumes to simply deny who 
he was, and to will himself free of his habit, inevitably finds himself still driven by and 
entangled in his habit.24 Germinating with one’s situation and thereby discovering a 
way of being that responds to and transforms the past which shapes one’s future is es-
sential to the development of freedom.        
     Germinating does not in itself ensure that the move one feels called to make is indeed 
a realization of freedom. There is no guarantee that one’s realization is in fact a liber-
ating realization. Like the artist who cannot be sure as he paints whether he is bringing 
to expression for the first time a reality and truth or only engaging in a clichéd repeti-
tion, we too cannot be certain in the process of pursuing freedom whether our decisions 
are truly realizing a new way of being ourselves or are only blindly repeating ourselves 
and even regressing. Is, for instance, a decision to quit this job the insightful recognition 
of a truth that has been making itself felt for years and the inauguration of a new and 
 
     23 Freedom as self-overcoming is thus really a matter of establishing new personal institutions. See 
Maclaren, “The ‘entre-deux’ of Emotions: Emotional Institutions and their Dialectic” (2017).
     24 Gregory Bateson highlights this dynamic in his article “The Cybernetics of Self” (1987). The alco-
holic remains imprisoned within his addiction so long as he supposes that he has it all under control, 
that he can handle it all himself. It is only when he gives up this notion of the self-sufficient individual 
that the healing transformation takes place.
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better life? Or is it merely a reactive response based in an inferiority complex, repeating 
an old structure, and leading to an even more constrained and unfulfilling future? Such 
ambiguities and uncertainties are endemic to our realization of our own freedom.  
     It is here that the importance—and danger—of intimate others for the development 
of an individual’s freedom emerges. This will be the focus of the remainder of this es-
say.   
     Always somewhat opaque to ourselves, never fully self-transparent, it is easy for us to 
miss ourselves. We can be carried away by the stories, tropes, and values that circulate 
in our social environment but are inadequate to our reality. We can equally be carried 
away by the ways in which others’ practices transgress into our experience, position us, 
and misleadingly define our sense of self and world. And we can be carried away by 
becoming stuck within our own complexes or bad habits, which reduce us to less than 
we can be.            
     Intimate others, however, can help bring us back to ourselves. They can help us re-
call who we have been and can be, and what really matters to us. They can do this in 
two ways. By virtue of knowing us well, intimate others can explicitly call to our atten-
tion a way in which we have diverged from our characteristic selves; if this divergence 
seems to work against our becoming, they can make a case for this, and call on us to 
acknowledge this and to come back to ourselves. Sometimes, however, our intimate 
others need say nothing: they call us back to ourselves simply by being themselves and 
doing the things they do.  In these ways, they draw us back into those shared interper-
sonal institutions that have previously configured our world and made us who we are—
institutions from which we have strayed.       
     Returning a person to herself can, however, inhibit her becoming rather than pro-
mote it if it does not also allow her to (as we have seen Merleau-Ponty say) “go farther.” 
Imagine that the institution that one has strayed from and to which one is returned is 
that which we found in the rebel pair, or in the “if it weren’t for you” couple. In the 
rebel pair, drawing one partner back into a shared way of being is drawing that individ-
ual back into a shared interpersonal institution that prevents her from being open to 
and moved by friends’ criticisms or perspectives.25 In the case of the “if it weren’t for 
you” couple, the quarreling couple draw each other back into the same old dynamic 
(“your duty is to be at home with me”; “if it weren’t for you, I’d be realizing myself”) 
which keeps them from facing their own anxieties and thereby developing themselves. 
To promote and support an intimate other’s becoming, then, each partner must not 
merely help the other return to her familiar ways of being. Each must also help her to 
“germinate” with those ways of being—to open herself up to feeling the tensions within 
these institutions and to find therein an impetus and means for going farther, for 
self-overcoming, and for realizing new, freer ways of being herself.      
     Here is where the great challenge and responsibility that intimacy is becomes more 
evident. On a Cartesian vision of the self, we might think that supporting an intimate 
other is simply leaving her free to become whomever she wants to be. But this vision of 
support is based upon a notion of the subject as ontologically separate from others, as 
      
     25Again, we can see an extreme version of this in the isolating effects of an abusive partner’s behavior. 
This partner may insist that “no one understands you like I do” and “it’s me and you against them” or 
“I need you to stay with me to help me,” thereby keeping the survivor of abuse from developing relation-
ships that might criticize and challenge the abusive relationship (Perez-Darby 2016, 109).
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self-possessed and self-transparent. And such a vision of the subject is precisely what is 
under challenge in this essay. Transgressed by others, a person is never simply ontolog-
ically separate, and she does not have herself wholly in her own hands; she is to a signif-
icant extent dispossessed and informed by others. As a result—that is, precisely because 
she can be carried away by others into momentary misrecognitions or into shared insti-
tutions of sense-making that do not do justice to who she has been and can be—that 
individual can be profoundly wrong about who she is and wants to be. An intimate 
other may, for instance, take herself to be quitting her job because she has “discovered” 
that she is not capable of doing this well and that to stay in her job is to be caught up in 
a futile and self-undermining struggle. But in fact this “discovery” may be a wrongful 
self-interpretation motivated by an employer who unjustly casts her as a bad employee, 
or by a long standing inferiority complex, or both.                 
     What is notable is that in this situation, an intimate partner does not have the option 
to “leave the other free,” and trying to do so would be the least supportive and most 
irresponsible course of action. Our worlds and identities are already intertwined; each 
person’s perspective already transgresses upon and informs the other’s, and these facts 
require that one take a stand one way or another on who one’s intimate other is. Leav-
ing my intimate other “free” to make her own choices and letting her simply quit her 
job is not in fact a neutral leaving free; it is rather an endorsement of her sense of herself 
as incapable. My silence in the face of her decision asserts “you know yourself, and 
whomever you take yourself to be must be who you are; if you think you are incapable 
of this line of work, that must be the truth.” My silence is not, therefore, a non-involve-
ment in her decision as it pretends to be; my silence is, as Merleau-Ponty says, “deciding 
on her behalf” insofar as it endorses and promotes a certain vision of who she is and 
what she ought to do (1964a, 154). It is, of course, still she who carries out the decision 
to quit, handing in her resignation to her employer, but that action grows out of a more 
fundamental decision about who she is and how her situation ought to be understood.26 
And in relation to this more fundamental decision I have played a part, helping bring it 
to crystallization, while simultaneously doing so under the guise of letting her decide 
who she is. My silent “leaving her free” is thus a deception.  If I am to live our intimacy 
truthfully, instead, I will have to take responsibility for the decisions that I unavoidably 
make on her behalf.  What would it mean truly to take responsibility for my transgres-
sions into my intimate other’s decisions? It may mean, interestingly, entering into con-
26 It is important to note that, when I speak of  “deciding on the others’ behalf,” I am not focusing upon 
a coercive relationship in which an abusive partner might pressure the survivor partner into making a 
certain decision. I am instead challenging the notion that, in those relationships which seem to leave 
each member free to make up her own mind, there is indeed total, uninhibited freedom. Even in those 
non-coercive relationships, I am arguing, there is unfreedom and deciding on the other’s behalf: that 
deciding on the other’s behalf  occurs at the level of  endorsing or denying the other’s vision of  self, world, 
and possibility, or transgressing into and usurping that vision with another one. To genuinely promote 
each other’s freedom, we need to become aware of  this more subtle “deciding on another’s behalf ” and 
take responsibility for it. This does not deny that there is an important line between the abusive, coercive 
intimate partner and the non-abusive, non-coercive intimate partner. But it does demand more subtlety 
in understanding the difference between the two.
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flict with my intimate other.27 In some situations, it may be that being true to my inti-
mate other, really standing by her and supporting her freedom or becoming, will require 
resisting her decision and calling on her to see this situation otherwise, to find in her situa-
tion a different sens or meaning than the one upon which she has settled. “It is not that 
you are incapable” we might say; “this seems rather an instance in which your inferior-
ity complex is running the show.” Such resistance might well be felt by my intimate 
other, in its immediacy, as violence, as a betrayal, for it is indeed a denial of, and taking 
distance from, her own position; it dismisses her position as out of touch with reality 
(even if it acknowledges how real and weighty an inferiority complex can be).28 And yet, 
as Russon notes in his investigation of loyalty, betrayal, and ethics in interpersonal re-
lationships, what is felt as a betrayal could be the greatest act of solidarity (2009, 93). 
For, the resistance and denial of the other is a taking distance from the other in order to 
call her back to herself, to help her better discover herself and find a truer enaction of her-
self.          
     For some of us, this prospect of resisting the other can inspire anxiety. For there is a 
presumption being enacted here. It is the presumption that I can see the situation better 
than my intimate other can, and that I am in fact helping her. Since, however, I (like my 
intimate other) am finite, not all-knowing, and addled by my own blindnesses, I could 
be wrong about this. It may be that I am calling her away from herself instead of back 
to herself. This could be not an act of solidarity—indeed, even worse, it could be a 
failed attempt at solidarity that is presenting itself as an act of solidarity. But the point 
of this essay, the insight articulated in Merleau-Ponty’s claim that we are, in intimacy, 
always deciding to some extent on the other’s behalf is this: we cannot help but pre-
sume; we are always already taking a stand. If, in fear of being presumptuous, I leave 
the other “free” to make her own decision, to quit her job, I am thereby endorsing her 
decision. I am presuming that she sees better than I, and that I have nothing to offer 
her. If this is true, then this presumption is a good one. But it if is false, then it is a pre-
sumption that has let my intimate partner down. betrayed her, and left her to damage 
her own life substantially when I could have helped her.          
     What, then, am I to do, if I cannot help but to presume and to decide on the other’s 
behalf?  I must take a stand—the best stand I know how to take—since I cannot do 
otherwise. But I must take it with an openness to finding out that I am wrong and to 
learning more about myself and my intimate other.29 I must make it from a stance that 
seeks understanding, communication, and mutual confirmation rather than a legisla-
tion of who the other is.  I can resist her in the moment, in other words, and produce a 
breakdown in our momentary sense of intimacy; but if I am to be responsible to our 
intimacy and committed to our mutual becoming and flourishing, and if I am to re-
main intimate and with her in a more enduring, overarching manner, I must do it from 
     
     27One might imagine that, on this model, one ought never to remain silent if one thinks one’s intimate 
other is going astray. Intimate life would then be a matter of constantly challenging each other. But this 
challenging mode of behavior also decides on the other’s behalf in the very mode that it assumes; in 
challenging rather than awaiting, it makes a claim about who the other is. It claims that she is incapable 
of coming to insight on her own, in time. We need, then, to acknowledge two forms of silence. There is 
the silence that merely goes along with, and thus endorses and is complicit.  But there is also the silence 
that trustingly holds open the space for the other to encounter the tensions in her own stance and to find 
her own way back to herself. Parker Palmer describes this silence well in “Deep Speaks to Deep,” in A 
Hidden Wholeness (2004).
     28 In “Pain and Agency” (2016), Shannon Hoff notes how pain is not only negative, and can in fact be 
an inevitable concomitant of  the very interpersonal transgressions of  boundaries that enable self-trans-
formation and the development of  greater agency. 
     29 Taken up in this way, intimacy can in fact be one of the best of forums for becoming existentially 
educated, and developing one’s interpretive resources and insights.
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within a co-established, co-perpetuated, interpersonal institution of communica-




Intimacy, I have proposed, is not made up of inner feelings and beliefs about oth-
ers; it is rather the fact that others transgress into our own perspectives and shape 
our sense of world and self. Such intimacy is present in all our interpersonal re-
lations in the form of what I have called “ontological intimacy.” It also underlies 
our concrete experiences of intimacy—whether with strangers or intimate oth-
ers. Here, the transgression enables momentary experiences of connection; but 
it can also be deepened and come to carry more weight by virtue of becoming 
embodied in habitual and enduring dynamics of mutual self-and-world-definition. 
We establish between us shared interpersonal institutions; the other comes to be 
embodied in me and my outlook, and I come to be embodied in her and hers. 
     Transgression into the other’s experience, informing how she finds herself posi-
tioned and defined in the world is, then, inevitable. The question is not how to avoid 
it, but whether we are owning up to it and its effects—are we being honest about 
and taking responsibility for what we are already doing? These transgressions are, 
in fact, impositions of a kind of unfreedom on the other.  Within this unfreedom lies 
great dangers of interpersonal violence, alienation and oppression. But this unfree-
dom can also be the greatest enabler of freedom. One person’s perspective working 
within another’s also takes that other beyond her current form of sense-making. If, in 
doing this, the transgression enables that other to come back to who she has been: to 
germinate with that, and to “go farther,” discovering new ways of being herself that 
resolve tensions that had been making themselves felt, then that transgression and 
imposition of unfreedom works in the service of freedom. And the freer others are, 
or the more they are in touch with the reality and imperatives found within them-
selves, their situations, and their social and natural environments, the better their 
transgressions will work to resist our own errancy and enable freedom within us. The 
great challenge of intimate relations, then, is to forge a way of being with others—in 
the moment and through shared interpersonal institutions—that takes responsibility 
for the transgressions and encroachments we inevitably effect, and that enacts them 
in ways that promote openness, communication, recognition, and becoming.   
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